Joe Sharkey At Large

Well, it’s all the American pilots’ fault, as they keep insisting in Brazil. It must be, it just must!

[The photo, by the way, is from the Kansas State Historical Society and, except for its use of the terms "aerial insanity" and "dip of death-spiral dive-steep banking," has nothing to do with the case in Brazil.]

So far, though, evidence that is not in dispute shows that the Sept. 29 accident was caused by a series of misfunctions, malfunctions, screw-ups and maybe outright malfeasances at and by air traffic control, on the ground — abetted in small part by a transponder that malfunctioned for some reason on the Legacy.

For 55 minutes before the crash, Brazilian air traffic control overlooked the fact that the Legacy transponder wasn’t signaling. It is, as I have said here before, part of their job to notice such fairly important things.

Meanwhile, as the Brazilian authorities nervously await the reaction from the 134-page report on the cause of the accident submitted to the Federal Police by ExcelAire, the Long Island charter company that owned and operated the Legacy, Brazil’s largest newspaper, Folha de S. Paulo, timidly broaches the subject of whether just maybe the Air Force will have a look at training Brazil’s air traffic controllers better — not that they were in any way at fault, mind you.

Also, you real buffs on this saga will enjoy the section below (”Altitude Error”) in which it is again mentioned that “large oscillations in altitude” by the Legacy preceded the collision. In fact, the large oscillations recorded on the busted-valise of air-traffic control technology in Brasilia were figments of the radar system’s crazed technological imagination, not actual depictions of altitude changes being made by the Legacy, which flew steadily at 37,000 feet under prior ATC orders.

Remember, the oscillations were seized upon by the Defense Minister Wonderful Waldir Pires and others to charge that the Legacy pilots were doing performing illegal stunt maneuvers over the Amazon at the time of the collision to show off the plane?

Turns out “in reality,” as Folha now says and as everyone in world aviation has known practically since day one, and as I have been reporting since October, the oscillations were caused by a technical failure in the radar. Back in early October, I mentioned well-known faults in Brazil’s radar system that every international pilot is aware of. Wonderful Waldir practically had a stroke rushing to denounce this calumny.

The tone coming from Brazil now seems so say, well, we’ll get around to looking at maybe making some corrections in this broken system .. manana, or should that be amanha in Portuguese?

Meanwhile, I’ll be posting the full 22,000-word ExcelAire report, in English, properly translated by our Sao Paulo bureau chief Mr. Pedicini … manana.

Here’s Folha’s blurb on Page One to an inside story:

“Seven months after worst airplane disaster, Air Force still has not implemented security measures

The Brazilian government has still not implemented safety measures that should correct flaws in the air traffic control system, seven months after the country’s worst airplane accident, in which 154 people died.

One of the principal initiatives waiting for implantation is the change in the software that “translates” the radar data into screen information. According to the FAB, it could have confused the controller.

The controllers should also have been trained in flight clearances (authorizations), hand offs to to other centers and procedures for communications losses. No classes have taken place.

The Air Force says that it is studying alterations in the control software and that the controllers’ training should only change after the accident investigation.

Of the announced measures, the only ones that have been taken are the changes in the manual, and English classes. Page C1

And from C1:

Folha de São Paulo
FAB analyzes changes in air traffic control

other side

BRASILIA BUREAU

Questioned by the Folha about the implementation of changes in air traffic control software because of the preliminary results of the investigation into the Flight 1907 accident, the Air Force Command informed that there is a “list of suggestions” under analysis and still not approved. On the training of controllers, it said that suggestions will be adopted only after the conclusion of the Air Force investigation.

Without citing the recommendation to add an audio or visual alert, on the screen, in case of the loss of a plane’s transponder signal, the FAB affirmed only that software changes may be contracted in the future, but did not say when.

“These suggestions are in analysis at Decea [Department of Air Space Control] so that, if they are approved and after the necessary details are determined, they can be included in the next version of the software to be contracted to be applied in future modernizations”, said the FAB’s official note, signed by brigadier Antonio Carlos Bermudez. No forecast was made about possible training for controller, nor the topics to be covered.

“After the conclusion of the accident investigations, if there is any recommendation relative to controller training, Decea will promptly adopt it, always with the greater objective of increased safety in air activities”, the text said.

The FAB did not respond to the questions about the updating and application of rules about loss of communication with aircraft on the part of air traffic control. It said that, in this case, it it up to the pilot to activate the emergency code on the onboard equipment and follow the flight plan.

The FAB also said that Cenipa and Decea “are unaware of” the preliminary suggestions of the NTSB (National Transportation Safety Board), which officially participated in the aeronautic investigation in conjunction with Brazilian authorities. “It is worth emphasizing that all the suggestions of a preventative nature are opportune and will be evaluated”, the note said. (LS)

Radar image showed transponder failure
Brasilia Bureau

On the day of the accident, the Legacy’s transponder became inoperative after passing Brasilia and impeded the triggering of the anti-collision system and left air traffic control without an altitude reading.

Instead of warning of this, the data on the controller’s screen were automatically exchanged for imprecise altitude information, calculated by the primary radar - which doesn’t use data sent by the aircraft.

In the Legacy’s case, the controller received information which varied from 33,700 feet to 38,300 feet, without the jet having left 37,000 feet, as shown by radar images obtained by the Folha.

The controller had presumed that the flight plan was being observed because this information was also automatically updated on the screen. According to the NTSB, this should be revised. For them, this cannot happen without the “clearance” (confirmation or authorization) of the controller who is monitoring the flight.

THE EVOLUTION OF THE PROBLEMS
Series of images shows failures in air traffic control system

First picture shows radar shot with “370=370 “, may be Figure 5. Graphic has overlay identifying it as “29 Sep 2006 - 18:51:33″ Note that “Sep”is English, not Portuguese. To right, badly done map - Legacy doesn’t pass through Brasilia and Legacy’s planned flight from accident site is “to USA”, not to Manaus.

• Radar Functioning Without Problems
• Before arriving in Brasilia, the radar read the Legacy correctly.
• The cross sign with a circle around it indicates the position and the radar coverage

Loss of coverage

• Image shows exact moment of loss of Legacy by secondary radar, at 19:02 (16:02).
• There is no longer a circle around the target
• Altitude reading is imprecise, modified with a “Z”
• N600XL Legacy
  370Z360
  46 S077W Speed and Heading

Altitude Error

• At this point, the large oscillations in altitude begin. In little more than 10 minutes, at least three different altitudes were registered before the moment of the accident.
• Legacy continues without transponder and primary radar makes incorrect altitude reading of 33,700 feet. In reality, the plane was at 37,000 feet.

–ends

The dismal, embarrassing annual ass-kissing fest known as the White House Correspondents Dinner has taken a major kick in the kiester. I think the mob might soon be marching on Versailles, and we know how that eventually worked out for the bewigged and perfumed courtiers. (See post, 4/23).

***

Brazilian authorities will conclude their so-called “investigations” into the Sept. 29 mid-air disaster much sooner than they’d planned, in a political move to head off what will be a very hard-hitting documentary to be aired next month on the Discovery Channel Brazil, laying out step by step how this disaster occurred.

The documentary will come on the heels of the wide release of a stunning 134-page recent report by ExcelAire’s lawyers in Brazil to the Federal Police. That report — which absolves the two American pilots of blame — lays out in minute detail what happened each step of the way, and also documents problems such as avionics equipment in the Legacy that had previously been repaired. ExcelAire says it was never informed that this equipment — including a component where the transponder was installed — was not new and had been repaired because of earlier problems.

(On the matter of civil litigation, please see this from Brazzil.com — but also note the reader comments, which appear to reflect what Brazilian authorities fear most: a possible political backlash over the blatant seven-month-long attempt to scapegoat the American pilots for what was in fact a series of terrible air-traffic control errors on the ground and likely technical failures of both in-flight and on-ground equipment.)

Our Sao Paulo bureau chief Richard Pedicini has painstakingly translated the full 22,000-word ExcelAire report into English (it was submitted in Portuguese) and I’ll be posting key parts in coming days.

This is important to note: None of the facts in this report regarding the minute-by-minute account of what happened on the ground and in the air on Sept. 29, 2006, are in dispute, to my knowledge. When discussing this tragedy, the Brazilian authorities have been adamant in not addressing the known facts. Instead, they repeat over and over that the American pilots were at fault, pointing vaguely to the transponder issue.

I am told that authorities of the Brazilian Air Force — which runs both civilian and military air traffic control –and the Federal Police are increasingly desperate to find some way to quickly get back on the offensive, as reality rudely barges in on their little tea party.

Stay tuned.

–end

Leave it to Matt (”No Original Reporting”) Drudge to go all fluttery linking to this monster scandal , via the deadly combination of the AP and Newsday. It seems participants in the Democratic debate in South Carolina yesterday flew from Washington on chartered private jets!

Now the last time I flew on a private jet I was a hitchhiker, and that trip ended abruptly and tragically with a mid-air collision at 37,000 feet over the Amazon.

But I’ve written a lot, before that event and after, about the rapidly growing field of business aviation, including charter jets. I myself fly coach unless my steadily declining elite-status scores me an occasional and damned infrequent upgrade to first class. But I have a pretty good understanding of why it on occasion makes perfectly good sense for some people to fly a private jet, including a charter.

For one thing, a growing number of small and even mid-sized cities don’t have commercial air service, or if they do, it’s very limited. So for most business travelers, even the most simple of trips — let’s say Washington D.C. to Orangeburg, S.C., where the debate was — require staying overnight. And increasingly, the only way to get from Point A to Point B by commercial airline, especially if Point b is a lower-case destination, is by connecting through Point C and maybe even Point D.

There is a private airport in Orangeburg, S.C. for business aircraft.

But the nearest airport with commercial-airline service is in Columbia, S.C., 40 miles away. And most of the commercial flights from Washington to Columbia require a connection — Detroit, Chicago, Charlotte, and Atlanta are among them.

Anyone who travels on business a lot knows that a simple little trip, say the 430 miles from Washington to a small town in South Carolina, can eat up most of two days — coming and going — on a commercial airline.

On Orbitz.com, which gives you most airline fare data, commercial coach fares for that trip range from $772 to $1,549. The first-class fare is roughly $1,750 on the few flights that use planes on that route that aren’t cramped regional jets with all-coach seating.

The AP report — which stumbles all over the field and gets hopelessly lost in the thicket of Part 121 and Part 135 F.A.A. flight certifications, like a British gardening writer trying to explain the Infield Fly Rule — says a round-trip charter flight for that route on a typical six-seat business jet costs between $7,500 and $9,000.

I don’t know where they got those figures, but I do know $7,500 is about what it would cost for a Lear 60 mid-size jet charter, with a quality charter company, on a one-day trip of this sort. The flight would take about an hour each way, Washington D.C. directly to Orangeburg and back, and the plane would be waiting to take you home when you were ready to leave.

Assume six passengers, because a serious presidential candidate would typically need to travel with an entourage of about that. Assume they are not going to travel in coach, and I am perfectly willing to assume that. Do the math: figure in the wasted time at a commercial airport (using a private airport, you can drive practically up to the plane 15 minutes before departure). Add in time spent in connecting airports, plus driving to and from your actual destination and the wasted time in having to spend the night and fly home the next day — and the economics of that charter flight start to add up.

I know, we’re gearing up for political season and various media wannabe hotshots are scrambling to make their bones with gotcha stories, especially if they can thread in some half-assed scolding lesson about “carbon imprints.” Jayzus, do a story about turning down the air conditioning in shopping malls, then! Or find out why we need two air forces, the Navy’s and the regular U.S.A.F. Or why we need a dozen huge aircraft carriers (current price tag about $5 billion). Or why we still fire up that stupid shuttle and shoot a bunch of astronauts off in a huge explosion to a barely orbiting and utterly useless space station, like some Wile E. Coyote stunt.

By the way, you never see much about the economics of Air Force One, a monster 747, and the dummy Air Force One that sometimes flies along as a decoy. Not to mention Air Force Two, with Deferral Dick hunkered down on his way to shoot some poor little duck. Duck! I mean the imperative, not the critter.

But even there, these guys have big jobs — there’s a war on, dammit! — and they can’t do them wedged in the middle seat between two hulking Secret Service agents. I want them working, not thumbing through the inflight magazine with their elbows pinned to their sides, hoping not to knock their little 3-ounce cup of Diet Coke over.

I say it’s time to lose this faux populist nonsense — unless some presidential candidate actually gets caught with a girlfriend or boyfriend on their lap while flying to the Bahamas for a policy seminar. Oh wait, that was a yacht, come to think of it. Poor boy never did get over that one.

–end

I dislike it when journalists misuse the term snafu, which comes out of World War II GI jargon — evidently borrowed from British military jargon — and means: Situation Normal, All F***** Up.”

Not to be a grammar schoolmarm, but snafu is grossly misused in print, like “gold standard” and “beg the question.” Typically, you see it used these days to describe what is, in fact, an abnormal situation. But in these cases some terms that came out of the original Iraq war — “goatf***” and the even more dire “clusterf***”– would actually be more appropriate. Though the schoolmarms who do oversee usage in print would shriek in horror, and in fact you’ll notice I’m using asterisks to mask the obvious words, so who am I to be calling anyone a schoolmarm, especially since this is technically a run-on sentence hanging on a subordinate clause?

Whatever. I now regret to say that “snafu” is rapidly becoming the right word to describe airport and airline overcrowding. This summer may well be the summer in which snafu comes into its own.

It happened again the other day. Weather shut down Dallas/Fort Worth International Airport, flights were diverted and planes sat on ramps for unconscionable periods of time. This was a near reply of the Dec. 29 fiasco at DFW, and the Valentine’s Day clusterf*** mostly involving JetBlue at Kennedy airport.

[The illustration, above left, is from "Airplane!" (1980), which I regard as the funniest movie ever made about air travel.]

Anyway, get used to the system being tied up in knots. We’re always going to have weather; weather is clearly becoming more severe; and our air-traffic system, not just the airlines and airports but the F.A.A. as well, has no slack in it.

Tomorrow, we’ll have a look at the FAA’s predictions for worsening air-traffic congestion.

Here are two links to the latest mess. This, from KVUE in Austin. And thisone from the folks pushing for the passengers bill of rights.

And I recently read in my favorite newspaper about a new cheap-fare startup airline that’s going to ban passengers from carrying on any snacks, so they’ll have to buy them on-board. Have a look here.

Who says they can enforce that?

–end

Here’s a “Kodak Moment” I’ll bet that Sen. Obama will ultimately come to regret having shared.

***

This isn’t a political blog, but I’m astonished at watching the slow-motion meltdown of Sen. John McCain, who formally announced his candidacy for the Republican nomination for president today.

Last night, Sen. McCain, a frequent guest on Jon Stewart’s “Daily Show” program on Comedy Central, got involved in a tendentious interview in which, among other things, he joked that while shopping in that splendid Baghdad market he praised as so safe last month, he purchased for Mr. Stewart “a nice little IED to put under your desk.”

Here’s a link to the interview (which goes on way too long, by the way). This is just a few days after Sen. McCain was shown in a video singing the start of a “Bomb, bomb, bomb; bomb, bomb Iran” ditty to the tune of the Beach Boys’ “Barbara Ann.” You have to wonder about the guy’s judgment when a presidential candidate advocating widening a hugely unpopular war thinks it’s funny to joke about aerial bombs as well as IEDs — improvised explosives devices, including roadside bombs, which are routinely killing and maiming our troops in Iraq.

Incidentally, that “Bomb, bomb Iran” parody is actually contained in a wickedly sharp cartoon, an anti-Bush satire titled “Let’s Bomb Iran” by Adam Kontras, that’s making the rounds online and has been downloaded at least a half-million times already. Here’s a separate link if that one doesn’t work. As a satire, it’s a riot.

But from a guy who used to drop bombs for a living and who wants this war to continue and even escalate … not so funny. Joking about bombing in general, for that matter, is something Sen. McCain ought to be a little sensitive toward. Sen. McCain was a Navy bomber pilot in Vietnam who was shot down on a bombing raid and spent 5 years in horrible conditions in a Hanoi prisoner of war camp. In captivity, he behaved with courage and dignity. But he might consider losing the bomb yuks.

ADDED APR. 26: (”Just Getting Started’???!!)

From the AP: “Gen. David Petraeus, the top U.S. commander in Iraq, said Thursday that conditions in Iraq may get harder before they get easier and will require ‘an enormous commitment” over time by the United States. …The four-star general, named by President Bush to oversee the recent buildup of American forces, cited some progress in the two months since the troop increase began. Still, he said, ‘there is vastly more work to be done across the board. … We are just getting started with the new effort.’

“…He said that the increasing use of roadside bombs and suicide attacks, plus the greater concentration of U.S. troops among the population, has ‘led to greater U.S. losses’ as well as increased Iraqi military casualties…”
***

Meanwhile, Rep. John Murtha assailed McCain on the House floor for his joke about IEDs, ABC News says. “Imagine a presidential candidate making a joke about IEDs when our kids are getting blown up,” said Murtha, who as a Marine officer during the Vietnam war received a Bronze Star and two Purple Hearts.

Ex-Capt. “Bombsaway” McCain defended his wisecracking about IEDs. “I don’t know how to react to that kind of hysteria to a comedy show,” he told Diane Sawyer [the former Nixon aide] on “GMA.” “All I’m going to say to Murtha and others. … Lighten up and get a life.” [He should say the same to the troops who lost theirs from IEDs]

And for the record, Capt. Bombsaway, we lost the war in Vietnam after dropping more tons of bombs on it than were dropped by Allied forces in all of World War II.

P.S. — You think I’m being harsh? Lookit this.

***

Awaiting a sane response (that’s my criterion) from Brazil to the damning 134-page report by the American air charter company ExcelAire about how and why Brazil’s worst aviation accident occurred last Sept. 29, I somehow overlooked this response, which doesn’t quite meet the criterion. Nevertheless, from O Estado de S. Paulo:

“The ‘only cause’ for the air collision between the Gol Boeing and the Legacy jet on September 29th, leading to the death of 154 people, was ‘the failure of the air traffic control system’ to ensure that the airplanes were traveling at different altitude levels. This is the argument defended in a 134-page report prepared by lawyers Carlos Dias and Theo Dias, who represent the Legacy pilots Joe Lepore and Jan Paul Paladino. The document was delivered … to Federal Police Marshal Renato Sayão, who heads the inquest.

“[The report] offers the information that there were several failures in the Legacy’s equipment in tests performed prior to its first commercial flight. According to the report, a radio management unit of the airplane was returned to Honeywell, the manufacturer, after being installed in another airplane.

“This fact, the text says, had never been revealed by Embraer, the jet’s manufacturer, to ExcelAire, the American company that acquired the Legacy. Dias says that, for this reason, ‘it is impossible to blame the pilots for the cause the accident, for wrong management of the equipment.’”

Now here is the money quote:

“… Sayão said that the report ‘“does not provide sufficient documentation’ on the previous failures of some of the jet’s equipment. ‘The intention is obviously to fully clear the pilots, but that’s not where the investigations are leading us,’ [he said].”

My note: Damn those pesky facts…

–end

Was unable to join the “cream of American journalism” at the White House Correspondents Dinner Saturday night. That’s the fun-fest where the White House Press Corps (as they actually refer to themselves) play grab-ass with White House figures and various celebrities who have rolled them for years. The headline entertainment was by the literally inimitable Rich Little, who was hired evidently because Red Skelton was unavailable. (And jeez, do I miss that Klem Kadiddlehopper!)

Anyway, thanks to the anonymous attendee who sent me a snapshot from the festivities (above right).

The following is by Glenn Greenwald in Salon:

“Every time I write about the media here, Paul Rosenberg notes in comments that he refers to the national press and its various hangers-on and appendages as “Versailles“. Could he possibly ask for any more vivid evidence than these accounts of the White House Correspondents’ Association Dinner last night and the accompanying after-parties? That is the Beltway culture stripped to its decadent, self-loving, vainglorious core.

“The dominant political story today in our press is focused on what Sheryl Crow and Laurie David said at one of the parties. These journalists and political operatives excitedly invite Hollywood celebrities to their parties so they can feel celebrated and glamorous, and then spend the next day condescendingly mocking the celebrities they invited and spent all night eagerly fondling, all in order to feel superior and elevated above the muck (”ha, ha — as though Sheryl Crow (whom we invited and chased around hoping to speak with) knows anything about global warming or other Important Political Things! Ha ha!”). Whenever you feel bewildered at the state of our political affairs, just keep those pages bookmarked and look at the pictures and all will be clear again.”

And here’s a link to courtiers at Versailles.

–end

I don’t have the full English text yet of the report on the Sept. 29 mid-air disaster that ExcelAire sent to Brazilian authorities to summarize its case that the 2 American pilots did not cause the accident. (The full PDF text in Portuguese is linked in yesterday’s post).

But thanks today to our man in Sao Paulo, Richard Pedicini, who’s been assiduously translating it, here are highlights of documentation ExcelAire can cite and charges it will make in its own defense as Brazilian authorities continue their campaign to scapegoat the Americans:

• As has long been known, air traffic control at departure in San Jose dos Campos authorized the Legacy to fly at 37,000 feet all the way to its destination Manaus (which involved passing through Brasilia ATC space)
• Air traffic control in Brasilia was negligent in not contacting the Legacy pilots to tell them to descend to 36,000 feet, or to acknowledge that the jet was at 37,000 feet.
• Air traffic control in Brasilia was negligent in not adopting “standard procedures” to notify the Legacy pilots that their transponder was not signaling, even though they [the controllers] were aware of this fact.
• Even after the “total loss” of the Legacy signal on both primary and secondary radars, air traffic control in Brasilia negligently failed to secure a 2,000-foot minimum separation between the Legacy and the oncoming Gol Airlines 737.
• Air traffic control in both the Brasilia and Amazonas centers made errors during the coordination of handover of the Legacy from one region to the other.

The report also addresses “production problems” with the Legacy jet, and “problems” (chiefly with some wiring) “detected on aircraft delivery,” on Sept. 29, 2006, the same day it collided with the Gol 737.

“Analysis of the air traffic control transmissions and the Legacy’s cockpit recorder confirm that both of the aircraft had been cleared by Air Traffic Control to fly at the same altitude and in the same airway, in opposite directions. As demonstrated, though this collision course had been established more than an hour before the accident, a series of failures in the air traffic control system impeded the controllers responsible for these two aircraft [in] noting the error in time to avoid the tragedy,” the ExcelAire report says.

The report also addresses the flight plan that was, as is normal procedure in international aviation, superseded when ATC issued different orders:

“Besides the problems with the Legacy’s avionics components, determining failures by Air Traffic Control were pointed out. This accident occurred under instrument flight rules (IFR) in controlled air space. Under those conditions, aircraft movement, both horizontal and vertical, is subject to the authorizations of air traffic controllers. An authorization is an obligatory instruction for an aircraft, which must be followed, except in case of an emergency.

“In this specific case, before takeoff, Embraer transmitted the Legacy’s flight plan electronically to air traffic control, supplying, among other data, the proposed flight route and the altitudes for the trip from São José dos Campos (SBSJ) to Manaus. The plan proposed: (a) cruise altitude of 37.000 feet from SBSJ to Brasilia; (b) after Brasilia, descent to 36,000 feet to point Teres, approximately 228 nautical miles northwest of Brasilia; (c) at Teres, ascent to a cruise altitude of 38,000 feet to Manaus. Soon after takeoff, however, air traffic control authorized the Legacy to ascend and maintain 37,000 feet, and, after this, there were no other authorizations for change of altitude.

“The Legacy’s position was monitored by means of secondary signals from radar surveillance, which uses information supplied by transponder mode C to identify the aircraft on the air traffic control radar and inform its altitude. That information appears in a data block on the screens of air traffic control (”data block”), where the planned altitudes for the distinct flight segments also appear.

“About two minutes before the Legacy reached Brasilia, although the data block indicated that an altitude change had been planned, the controller did not alter its authorization for the Legacy to maintain a cruising altitude of 37,000 feet.

“Approximately 5 minutes after passing Brasilia, and 55 minutes before the accident, air traffic control stopped receiving the Legacy’s mode C transponder signal. The loss of the Legacy’s signal appeared on air traffic control’s data block, but, in violation of the basic rules of aviation, the controller responsible did not communicate that fact to the pilots, so that they could verify their transponder or switch to the other transponder. The controller also erred in failing to communicate the transponder’s inoperative state to another controller, and in failing to coordinate a non-radar separation of the Legacy along its planned flight route.”

The report stresses ExcelAire’s determination not to assign guilt but to fully document the chain of causes of the accident “in order to prevent similar occurrences in the future.”

Among recommendations, some of which that have already been made by international investigators looking into the fiasco, the report suggests:

• Greater English-language proficiency by Brazilian air traffic controllers
• Better training in crisis management, including procedures to follow when a transponder of an aircraft being handled stops signaling
• “Modification of [Brazilian] air traffic control displays to eliminate confusing and unnecessary data” that can cause operators to misread a plane’s actual altitude
• ATC center equipment that more clearly displays the loss of “secondary radar signals” from the screens that determine actual altitude
• Better training of controllers on taking “decisive action” to locate an aircraft during a loss of radio and/or radar contact

The Legacy pilots, the report says, “did not receive through the flight instruments located on the aircraft any indication of problems related to avionics components.” [My note: That's a reference to the malfunctioning transponder unit]

“At no time during the flight did the TCAS collision-avoidance signal appear on the control panel. The safety investigation also confirmed that the Air Traffic Control Center [in Brasilia] received various radio calls made by the Legacy, but did not answer.”

The report goes on to address in detail what ExcelAire considers defects in avionics equipment on the Legacy, including faulty connections between the antenna and the transponder. It also asserts that the Radio Management Unit (RMU) and the Communications Unit (RCZ) “were not new components” and that the RMU, which is key to a functioning transponder, “had already presented failures in two other aircraft before being installed in the new aircraft sold to ExcelAire by Embraer.”

“The RCZ, which includes the Mode C transponder, had also been rejected in another aircraft before being installed in the Legacy,” the report asserts.

***
Suddenly, it seems, the ball is in another court. When response is available from Embraer and Honeywell — the transponder manufacturer — I’ll post it.

Meanwhile, I’m still hoping to post an English link soon to the whole 20,000-word text for those of you, including so many pilots who have remained in touch with me over this sad event, who want to know just precisely how one sorry mistake after another on the ground added up to cause the worst aviation disaster in Brazil’s history.

–end