Monthly Archive for March, 2011

Browsing Through Spirit’s Latest SEC Filings

As most already know, Spirit Airlines filed for an IPO with the SEC late last year, and has subsequently revised the initial filing with goodies like full-year 2010 final results. I’ve been meaning to write about these updates for awhile, and coverage over some of the airline’s latest adjustments to its luggage policies.

Despite all the negative media coverage about Spirit’s luggage policies, the airline continues to generate significant revenue ($91.3 million in 2010) through its fees for bags. In fact, Spirit’s implementation of a fee for carry-on bags that do not fit under the seat resulted in significant revenue growth:

In August 2010, we introduced a fee for carry-on bags, resulting in a significant reduction in the number of carry-on bags checked at the gate. In the fourth quarter of 2010, the first full quarter of the carry-on bag fee, we experienced an increase in total bag revenue per passenger segment to $16.82, compared to $9.59 in the fourth quarter of 2009.

I wonder how much of that revenue increase is from the fee itself versus passengers choosing to pay lower fee for checked luggage.

Meanwhile, for 2010 Spirit reported operating of $68.9 million, compared to a $111.4 million net profit in 2009. It is worth noting, however, that Spirit estimates that its pilot strike last year “had a net negative impact on our operating income for 2010 of approximately $24 million.”

Spirit saw revenues increase 11.6% to $781.3 million, primarily driven by a 48.5% year-over-year increase in ancillary revenue to $243.3 million. Spirit notes, however, that its Big Front Seat (formerly first class) product is no longer sold as a separate fare but rather an upgrade, so revenue is now being reported differently.

One last interesting stat – Spirit’s ancillary revenue per passenger flight segment was $35.00 last year, up from $25.91 in 2009, but ticket revenue per segment decreased from $84.77 to $77.39.

Today’s Random Chart of the Day…

….is total domestic capacity over the past decade. I find it incredible that over the past ten years domestic capacity has ended up being relatively flat. Data is from the DOT’s T2 data set paired with TranStats’ uber-handy time series tool.

Thoughts on Alaska’s Response to Saturday’s Computer Troubles

Over the weekend, Alaska and Horizon operations were significantly impacted by technology issues. During some scheduled maintenance, a transformer blew at 3 AM on Saturday, bringing down their computer system used for flight planning purposes. Ouch. Roughly 140 Alaska and Horizon flights were canceled on Saturday, and flights that did operate faced long delays.

Fortunately, Alaska really shined over the weekend with its response to the issue. The airline issued not one, but two press releases during the day on Saturday as the situation developed. The carrier’s Twitter page was loaded with responses to customers. In addition, presidents of Alaska and Horizon recorded a video apology on Saturday and posted it on YouTube:

YouTube Preview Image

After all of these efforts by Alaska, their customers (spoiler alert!) began to appreciate the airline’s candid public response, at least based on the airline’s Facebook page. Here’s one notable example:

I was notified about the delay when I checked in online early in the morning, I called Reservations and got a truthful explanation of what had occurred, and then was thanked for my patience when I arrived at the airport….And now you post what appears to be an honest apology online. Thank YOU for treating all of us like a valued customer. I hope the same respect, kindness, and consideration that you’ve shown us today is returned by us to all of your hardworking employees — you all deserve it.

There was certainly some negative feedback as well – there were some negative posts on FlyerTalk, for example, but that thread also has comments commending Alaska and Horizon management for being honest and upfront about the issues.

Now, let’s compare this to another airline that recently had technology issues…Southwest. The airline faced a double whammy of technology problems, as one of the carrier’s main telecommunications providers experienced a service outage while Southwest was also upgrading its website for its new Rapid Rewards program. While the airline did post an apology after the fact, Southwest was very quiet during the event, and later said it didn’t see any issues with the way the issue was handled.

To be fair, Southwest probably still handled this situation better than other airlines would have, but I hold the carrier to a higher standard because it has made such a big deal about utilizing social media to communicate with customers.

In conclusion – mega kudos to Alaska for quickly, genuinely apologizing for a major operational issue. By doing so, the airline told it customers that it takes its pledge to be “North of Expected” very seriously.

The Random Chart of the Day…

…is the average stage length of the Southwest 737-500, the smallest 737 (122 seats) in the fleet. After reaching a low point (at least in the years I looked up) in 2006, it has increased by roughly two-thirds. Any theories on this — is it part of Southwest re-tooling its network?

The 737-500 is Southwest oldest and smallest fleet, with only 25 aircraft (16 owned, 9 leased). I’m interested in the future of this fleet (and the smaller narrowbodies in general) now that Southwest is acquiring AirTran’s 717s. I wonder if Southwest will continue to be interested in this segment, and if so, what are their long-term plans? How long will the -500s and 717s stick around?

And while I’m busy speculating, if Southwest were to further invest in this segment, which aircraft is best?

(Data source is DOT T2.)

Thoughts on the BTC’s Thoughts

Last week, the Business Travel Coalition (BTC) decided to opine on the story by issuing a press release entitled: “Predatory Airline Behavior is Back: Delta Air Lines Needs To Abandon Anticompetitive Response To New Entry.”

As I’m sure most people who are reading this blog know, a few weeks ago Frontier announced their summer schedule, which included new nonstops from Kansas City to Minneapolis. A short while after, Delta added new flights out of Kansas City (Boston, Columbus, New Orleans) as well as Omaha – Washington (National). Naturally, it’s very easy to view these additional flights as a response to Frontier’s new routes. (Frontier flies all of the routes Delta added, though the carrier is ending Kansas City – Columbus service).

In the news release BTC chief Kevin Mitchell said that “anticompetitive behavior sends an unmistakable message to other competitors to not trespass on the incumbent’s markets anywhere in its network, negatively impacting consumers even more broadly. Make no mistake, Delta’s heavy-handed, punitive attack on this low-cost carrier is meant to chill all other low-cost airlines that might otherwise try to mount competition at one of the most concentrated hub airports in the U.S.”

A few thoughts on this.

First, LCCs haven’t necessarily been afraid to try serving Minneapolis, like Southwest, but that’s beside the point. In our deregulated industry, carriers are free to enter and exit markets as they please. Because of this market structure, growth in fares to greatly lag inflation in consumer prices across the economy.

Second, even after accepting the thesis that these flights are purely a response to Frontier, I still think cases can be made for these routes. Take the Omaha – Washington, D.C. routes. Delta has been building up a nice little operation at DCA ever since the slot swap deal fell through, and its also the largest network carrier at Omaha.

Third, other than saying that the “Department of Justice and State Attorneys General should be on high alert to the return of strategies of predation and other anti-competitive practices in the airline industry,” the BTC doesn’t offer much in terms of recommendations. What should be the litmus-test for anti-competitive behavior? Would AirTran’s huge growth in Milwaukee against Midwest count? Should Delta not be allowed to compete with Southwest in Atlanta once the AirTran deal is complete? The fact is if we start heading down this path we head back towards regulation.

The organization also added this:

Delta’s move against Frontier adds further evidence and warning that the U.S. commercial aviation market is failing. Indeed, some two and one half years into the widespread implementation of programs that unbundle airline services from the base ticket, market forces are inadequate to drive airlines to make fee information available to the travel agency sales channel.

How is this relavent? While I think Frontier takes a better approach to ancillary revenue than Delta does thanks to this AirFairs program, both carriers have unbundled many services over the past three years.

The Chart of the Day Comes From…

…US Airways, who has abandoned hedging altogether in favor of rolling the dice and paying spot price. So far,  that strategy seems to be working:

President Scott Kirby said yesterday at a conference that hedging was “incredibly expensive,” especially call options. “The premiums for that insruance policy are more expensive than the benefit that you’ve gotten, even when fuel prices have gone up,” he said.

New item on my airplane dork bucket list – I want to interview US Airways execs about this one day. :D

You can find the whole presentation here.

Random Thoughts on Delta and the MD-90

It’s been a couple of weeks since news emerged that Delta was yet again expanding its fleet of MD-90 aircraft by purchasing nine of the aircraft from JAL, but I wanted to share a few thoughts on the move.

The Atlanta-based carrier now has 58 of the aircraft either flying, in modification, or to be delivered. But Delta had been operating only sixteen of the type for over a decade until it began tapping the used market to expand the fleet, so what’s changed? I started digging into the history of this fleet type, and it’s pretty interesting (in this dork’s humble opinion).

Photo Credit: Paul Filmer.

Launch Customer

While Delta ended up with only 16 MD-90s before its recent purchases, that number was far from the carrier’s original plans. In 1989, Delta became the launch customer for the aircraft, with 50 orders and 110 options. The type was originally slated to replace Delta’s aging fleet of 727s. (In the middle of 1995, when the first MD-90s were arriving, Delta operated over 130 727s, with an average age over 18 years.)

According to Delta’s fiscal 1994 annual report (the earliest available online) Delta was slated to take deliveries of 55 MD-90s, with deliveries beginning the following fiscal year:

But later annual reports indicate a reduction in the planned size of the MD-90 fleet. For example, in mid-1996, Delta had 12 MD-90s in service with a further 23 on order, for a fleet of only 35 aircraft. One year later, Delta had 16 MD-90s flying with 15 more on order, the carrier reported in its fiscal 1997 annual report.

Delta Goes Sole-Source

The figures presented above, however, excluded the effects of Delta’s March 1997 order with Boeing, including 70 orders for the 737 Next Generation, which had flown for the first time only weeks before the order. As explained in Delta’s annual report, the agreement included a sole-source arrangement with Boeing:

The understanding provides, subject to certain conditions, that Boeing will be the provider of new aircraft for Delta for 20 years, and that Delta may switch orders among these aircraft types and defer firm orders. The understanding would also accelerate the delivery dates for certain of Delta’s existing orders, terminate all of Delta’s existing options and cancel Delta’s remaining MD-90 orders.

For context purposes, the merger between McDonnell Douglas and Boeing was announced in December 1996, though the deal did not close until August 1997. The agreement between Boeing and Delta was not enforced due to competitive concerns raised by the European Union in response to the Boeing merger.

Delta also announced at this time that it would phase out the MD-90 from its fleet. A 1997 article from World Airline News noted:

Aircraft valuations experts are reconsidering their estimates of MD-90 values and preparing to adjust them downward as a result of Delta Air Lines’ announcement that it would phase out that model of aircraft from its fleet over the next 20 years. Delta still has 15 of the McDonnell Douglas aircraft on order. The MD-90 phase-out is part of Delta’s long-term fleet plan, which the carrier announced last week with its decision to make Boeing {BA} the sole provider of Delta’s aircraft over the next two decades.

By deciding to phase out the MD-90, and later cancelling its remaining orders, did Delta drive down MD-90 values? And if so, did Delta unintentionally make secondhand MD-90s cheaper to purchase over ten years later?

An Orphan Fleet No More

Following Delta’s 1997 fleet moves, the MD-90 fleet remained at 16 aircraft, and the airline was still planning to eliminate the type completely. The company’s fiscal 2000 annual report notes that Delta had “decided to accelerate the planned retirement of our 16 MD-90 aircraft and 8 owned MD-11 aircraft as part of our fleet simplification strategy,” and that it would retire the “MD-90 fleet and owned MD-11 aircraft over the next seven to nine years.”

And while the MD-11 left Delta’s fleet a few years ago, the MD-90 remained, and in 2009 reports began surfacing that the carrier was looking to expand the fleet. Why expand a fleet of older aircraft?

I’m willing to wager a big factor was cost. While the MD-90 isn’t necessarily the latest and greatest in terms of technology (compared to, say a 737-800), Delta can probably compensate for this with relatively low purchase price. Further, it’s interesting that Delta is growing this fleet while it is also removing old Northwest DC-9s along with smaller regional aircraft.

With that in mind, the MD-90 isn’t exactly terrible when it comes to unit cost. The aircraft’s unit cost performance should be aided by the fact that Delta is increasing the number of seats on the aircraft, from 150 to 160. Below is a chart utilizing data from the DOT, with cost data from Schedule P.5-2 of Form 41 and ASM data from the T2 summary data.

What’s also interesting is that the MD-90, of late, has been redeployed in the Delta network as the carrier has made adjustments in response to its merger with Northwest. In December 2009, for example, 23.5% of departing MD-90 seats came from Salt Lake City, with 19.5% from Atlanta. One year later, 45% of departing MD-90 seats left from Minneapolis. MD-90s have been oft-used on flights to the West from the hub acquired from its merger partner, to cities like Salt Lake City, San Diego, Los Angeles, San Francisco, and Denver. The move to MSP could possibly be attributed to a better matching of aircraft capabilities, with the MD-90′s more limited range making it better-suited for mid-con flights out of Minneapolis.

It appears that the MD-90 has found a comfortable home in Delta’s network, and we’ll have to see how the type is further deployed as Delta increases the size of this fleet in the coming months and years.

Photo Credit: Brandon Farris.

More Details on Delta’s Memphis Cuts

Delta’s cuts to its Memphis hub will be focused on markets primarily served by regional jets…this according to a press release sent to local media. Delta has yet to announce any specific changes.

The airline says that the “flight reductions beginning this fall are expected to be focused in small, regional markets where at least 90 percent of customers are connecting via Memphis, rather than originating or departing.”

Delta says it now plans to “operate 150 to 170 peak-day departures from Memphis, down from approximately 200 this summer.” While that amounts to up to a 25% reduction in departures, it will only amount to a 8-10% capacity reduction, probably because the markets to be cut are served by smaller aircraft on shorter stage lengths than mainline flights.

“Neither mainline Delta flight frequency nor mainline employee levels will be reduced,” Delta added.

The carrier will also “evaluate consolidating the majority of Delta and Delta Connection operations onto a single concourse – Concourse B – in 2012 to further strengthen the financial performance and efficiency of the hub.”

Anyway…time to play with some government data to speculate what will be cut. :D

Delta to Cut Memphis Departures by 25%

Delta is presenting at an investor conference later today, and the slides were posted earlier through the SEC. Interesting stuff already, including a 25% reduction in Memphis departures:

It’ll be interesting to see what flights are cut from Memphis…it’s an interesting little hub that Delta inherited from Northwest. But how much of the connecting traffic can be handled through a place like Atlanta?

On another slide, Delta provided an update on the effects of the Japanese earthquake, saying that “preliminary estimates range 2011 net impact at $250 – $400 million.”

More to come…a bunch of airlines are presenting today.

Speculating on Scope

The differences between the Continental and United scope clauses in their pilot contracts has been an issue that has been making me think for awhile. Continental’s is much more restrictive than United’s, and does not allow regional jets larger than 50 seats. As a result, the only large regional aircraft operating for Continental are the Colgan Q400s. United, however, has great flexibility in this area, and many CRJ-700s and E-170s are flying for the airline under the United Express banner.

Not surprisingly, this has been an issue with the merger of the two carriers.

The issue already arose late last year after United began scheduling larger regional jets (operating with Continental’s code) out of Continental hubs such as Houston and Newark. Continental’s pilot group, represented by ALPA, filed a grievance over the plan, and an arbitrator ruled that the flights did indeed violate Continental’s contract. These flights are still operating, but only with the United code.

Photo Credit: Jay Bowie.

Without a doubt, this ruling was a victory for Continental pilots, but we still have to pilot groups that are yet to be under a joint contract. How is scope handled when there are two pilot groups at one merged airline with very different contracts?

The decision to schedule larger regional jets out of Continental hubs in the first place suggests that United management is currently running with the United pilot contract, which provides the most flexibility for the company, but will likely cause the most angst among (Continental) pilots.

While the Continental pilots were able to secure an arbitration victory late last year, who knows what will happen in the future? It appears that the arbitrator only ruled that United can’t put the Continental code on the flights in question. But what’s the difference what’s the Continental code disappears? In such a situation, it would appear that management will have much less incentive to negotiate over scope than the pilots, where scope has serious job security implications.

How this will be negotiated is quite interesting. There’s a full range of possibilities out there, anywhere from a relaxed scope clause in exchange for better pilot compensation to larger CRJs and E-Jets becoming part of the mainline operation.

Either way, this issue is far from resolved, and can either be negotiated in the short term, or become a long-term source of labor strife. In addition, it can also have significant impacts on the orderbooks of United and its regional partners.

Looking at Alaska’s Latest Update

Alaska Air Group (parent of Alaska and Horizon) released its latest investor update on Tuesday, and there were a couple of items that I found interesting:

  1. Fuel prices. Alaska currently expects its economic fuel cost* for mainline flights to be $2.74 for the first quarter, up 29% year-over-year. One would have to assume other airlines are seeing such dramatic increases. The run-up in fuel prices has just been incredible.
  2. Unit revenues. The airline says that RASM for mainline flights in February was up 1.1% year-over-year, to 12.70 cents. PRASM increased 2.1%, to 10.70 cents. Alaska provided addition context to these gains, saying that they “are compared to RASM and PRASM gains of 16.7% and 13.1% in February 2010, respectively – among the highest RASM and PRASM gains in 2010.”
  3. Capacity growth plans. According to this latest update, Alaska plans that full-year mainline and consolidated capacity will increase 8-9% and 6.5-7.5% compared to 2010. This plan is the same as was forecast in January. I only find this interesting as other airlines (like American and United) have been adjusting capacity plans downward in response to higher fuel prices. Of course, this forecast could eventually change.

*Alaska’s definition of economic fuel expense:

Economic fuel expense is defined as the raw or “into-plane” fuel cost less any cash we receive from hedge counterparties for hedges that settle during the period, offset by the recognition of premiums originally paid for those hedges that settle during the period. Economic fuel expense more closely approximates the net cash outflow associated with purchasing fuel for our operation.